Este libro está dirigido a quien desee familiarizarse con los problemas clásicos y contemporáneos de la ética. Pero también está escrito desde un punto de vista y refleja una posición personal de l autora en torno a esta disciplina. En este libro se encontrarán nociones sobre un saber sistematizado que constituye el corazón de los conocimientos filosóficos. Pero en cuanto que la ética nos muestra esa pequeña pero poderosa arma que constituye la voluntad de transformación, liberación y cambio del ser (...) humano cabe esperar que la lectura de este tratado iniciador en la disciplina contribuya a la mejora de la vida y la sociedad humanas. (shrink)

Which is the relation between logic and philosophy of mind? This work tries to answer that question by shortly examining, first, the place that is assigned to logic in three current views of the mind: Computationalism, Interpretativism and Naive Naturalism. Secondly, the classical debate between psychologism and antipsychologism is reviewed -the question about whether logic is or not a part of psychology- and it is indicated in which place of such debate the three mentioned conceptions of mind are located.

El presente ensayo expone las principales ideas de Chomsky acerca de la Nueva Teoría de la Referencia. Contra dicha teoría, y específicamente contra propuestas bien conocidas de Kripke y Putnam, aduce Chomsky distintos argumentos. Las conclusiones de esos argumentos son las siguientes: que en los lenguajes naturales no hay nombres lógicamente puros; que no existe ninguna relación de referencia que conecte las palabras con las cosas; que los conceptos que maneja la así llamada teoría de la referencia no responden a (...) las exigencias metodológicas de la ciencia natural; y que el significado sí «está en la cabeza». Tratando de poner al descubierto los supuestos en que se fundan estas tesis, el ensayo identifica los siguientes cuatro:su naturalismo metodológico, su pragmatismo en materia de ontología, su perspectivismo conceptual y su racionalismo. (shrink)

In this article a view of emotional experience is set out that conceives emotional experience as a kind of perceptual experience. It is argued that both this view is embodied both by neuroscience of emotion and developmental psychology of emotion, although a significant part of recent research in experimental psychology has resorted to a kind of emotional stimuli that hardly square with the non-negotiable insight that perceiving is scouting. Finally, it is suggested that social referencing is in the backstage of (...) socalled paradigmatic scenarios, which provide the basis for emotional learning and in which emotions are typically shown. (shrink)

¿Qué relaciones hay entre la intencionalidad -el contenido- de los conceptos y pensamientos y el significado -el contenido- de las palabras y oraciones? El presente artículo analiza esta cuestión distinguiendo en ella seis problemas diferentes que atienden a la naturaleza primitiva de la intencionalidad de lo mental, su expresión, el papel del lenguaje o de las instituciones lingüísticas en las condiciones de individuación del contenido mental. Una vez separados unos de otros esos seis problemas, el artículo llama la atención sobre (...) un aspecto del problema hacia el cual la reflexión de los últimos años parece haber dejado de ser sensible: la faceta conceptual del estudio de esas relaciones. Aunque Wittgenstein y Ryle nos previnieron de que el estudio de estas relaciones está lleno de callejones sin salida, muchos científicos y filósofos no parecen ser conscientes de ello. (shrink)

El artículo trata de dos argumentos, los de la Circularidad y la Polaridad, que llevaron a Wittgenstein a sostener que la gramática es autónoma: que no hay hechos del mundo que justifiquen la verdad de sus reglas. Se señala que el Argumento de la Polaridad es consustancial a doctrinas centrales de la filosofía pos-tractariana de Wittgenstein y cómo la aceptación de que la gramática es autónoma le obligó a desmantelar aspectos centrales de la metafísica y la filosofía del lenguaje y (...) de la lógica del Tractatus que hacían posible ofrecer una justificación modal de la sintaxis lógica.This paper deals with two arguments, the Circularity Argument and the Polarity Arguments, that led Wittgenstein to claim that grammar is autonomous, i.e., that no rule of grammar can be justified by providing a fact as a reason to believe in its truth. It is argued that the Polarity Argument is intimately linked to central doctrines of Wittgenstein’s post-tractarian philosophy and shown how the acceptance of the autonomy of grammar forced Wittgenstein to give up the project of providing a modal justification of the rules of logical syntax. (shrink)

This paper contains two sections. In the first one, some ideas on human mind Dennett presents in his book Consciousness Explained are sketched. In the second section, a critical review is made on Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory. It is concluded that some of its proposals do not find enough experimental support from research on Cognitive Neuroscience. Even though there is no cardinal point in the brain, both functional and anatomical criteria can be found to distinguish conscious and unconscious information processing (...) in the human brain. (shrink)

Currents expositions of game-theoretical semantics two lines of interpretation are mixed. On the one hand, the theory provides a way of extending truht-conditions from atomic to non-atomic sentences. On the other hand, the theory analyze meaning by allowing us to describe a certain kind of compIex activities: verification games against Nature. In this paper, both inteperpretations are sorted out and their respective emphasized.

Currents expositions of game-theoretical semantics two lines of interpretation are mixed. On the one hand, the theory provides a way of extending truht-conditions from atomic to non-atomic sentences. On the other hand, the theory analyze meaning by allowing us to describe a certain kind of compIex activities: verification games against Nature. In this paper, both inteperpretations are sorted out and their respective emphasized.

This chapter examines Putnam's views on Pragmatism and points out that, according to this philosopher, metaphysical pluralism, i. e. antiessentialism, is not only the distinguishing feature of this philosophical trend, but also a feature that makes impossible to reconcile Pragmatism with what Putnam calls the Absolute Conception of Reality, a view he attributes to Bernard Williams. After calling the reader's attention towards how far is Putnam from adopting the Peirce Principle, which Dewey thought it to resume Pragmatism's main substance, it (...) is argued that this principle naturally fits in with two ingredients of the Absolute Conception, namely the transcendence requirement and the convergence requirement. Finally, the chapter claims that there are two different interpretations of the Peirce Principle, i.e.a verificationist reading and a non-verificationist one, and holds that the transcendence and convergence requirements were already present in Dewey's work on education. (shrink)

In this paper, we try to show why a formal definition of truth is not satisfactory (first point). Later, we expound (second point) the polemic between Austin and Strawson about truth with the intention to show that both refer to different problems concerning truth and to prove that Austin did not lose this confrontation and that we can recover some elements of his investigation for making an adequate approach to this notion. We will complete our definition of truth using the (...) latest thesis of Charles Travis and that will permit us to conclude with a semantic definition of truth for natural languages. (shrink)